Capital ‡ows with low intensity and ‡ows to middle-income countries. Physical and human capital alone cannot explain this pattern. I present a model to show how managerial ability-the ability to run risky projects-can increase total factor productivity and explain the pattern of capital ‡ows. The model implies that countries with more high-ability managers use more risky projects and have higher productivity. I de…ne proxies for managerial ability with data on physical and human capital, schooling, and entrepreneurship. Consistent with the pattern of capital ‡ows, the model predicts similar returns to capital across countries and higher returns in middle-income countries.
INTRODUCTION
This paper shows how managerial ability can increase total factor productivity and explain the pattern of capital ‡ows. Capital ‡ows with low intensity and ‡ows to middle-income countries. We can explain this pattern if returns to capital are similar across countries and higher in middle-income countries. Physical capital and human capital alone cannot explain the variation of output across countries and cannot explain capital ‡ows (Lucas 1990 , Caselli 2005 . I calibrate the model and calculate returns to capital with di¤erent proxies for managerial ability.
As needed to explain the pattern of capital ‡ows, I …nd returns to capital similar across countries and higher in middle-income countries.
1 I use the model of Imrohoroglu and Kumar (2004) . Imrohoroglu and Kumar explain the low intensity of capital ‡ows and the direction of capital ‡ows with intermediation costs. I extend their framework to allow for di¤erent distributions of managerial abilities and set the intermediation costs to zero. The motivation for this is that intermediation costs have been decreasing with market deregulation and …nancial innovation but the pattern of capital ‡ows has not changed. Capital continues to ‡ow with low intensity and to middle-income countries. The di¤erence in conditions to foster managerial abilities, however, is large and it is more di¢ cult to revert. Can a model without intermediation costs generate the same pattern: middle-income countries with higher returns? Surprisingly, only the di¤erences in managerial abilities, 1 The low intensity of capital ‡ows refers to the observed capital ‡ows compared to the predictions of the neoclassical model on the returns to capital. The rich countries (those in the highest quartile of capital per worker in Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare 1997) have 40 times the capital per worker of poor countries (those in the lowest quartile). Given these di¤erences in capital per worker, capital had to ‡ow fast from rich to poor countries. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, however, out ‡ows minus in ‡ows of foreign direct investment in 2004 from developed countries (Australia, Israel, Japan, Malta, New Zealand, North America, and Western Europe by the United Nations classi…cation) were 250 billion dollars, or only 1 percent of the sum of GDP of these countries. To see that capital ‡ows to middle-income countries, the 50 least developed countries received in 2004 only 3 percent of all in ‡ows to developing countries (UNCTAD 2006). without the intermediation costs, are able to account for the pattern of capital ‡ows.
One advantage of the model of Imrohoroglu and Kumar is to allow countries to use the technology in di¤erent ways. Agents can produce output with a risky and a safe technology. When we include the e¤ects of managerial ability, countries with more high-ability managers use the risky technology more intensively. The composition of risky and safe projects changes according to the distribution of abilities. The technologies of risky and safe projects are available for all countries, but countries with more high-ability managers use the technologies more e¤ectively by using more risky projects. In accordance with this prediction, if we interpret the safe technology as traditional technologies and agriculture, Caselli and Feyrer (2007) show that poor countries use capital more heavily in natural-resource sectors and agriculture.
The model clari…es how countries with more high-ability managers use the available technology more e¤ectively.
In the model, managers decide to undertake risky or safe projects. The probability of success in risky projects increases with managerial ability. If all countries have the same distribution of managerial ability then the ranking of returns is the same as in the neoclassical model: returns are higher in countries with less physical capital.
Accounting for managerial ability makes returns closer across countries and higher in middle-income countries.
I use data on physical capital and human capital from Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) , on years of education from Barro and Lee (2001) , and on entrepreneurship from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (Reynolds et al. 2005) to de…ne proxies for managerial ability. When income and managerial ability are positively related, returns in capital-rich countries can be higher than in countries with little capital.
Managerial ability overcomes the decrease in the marginal return to capital.
The model implies that total factor productivity (TFP) increases with managerial ability. That is, returns increase, keeping physical and human capital constant, when managerial ability increases. Managerial ability works as an unmeasured component of physical or human capital able to a¤ect production. The purpose of the paper is to understand how managerial ability can increase TFP. In particular, to explain how managerial ability increases TFP in a way that (1) returns to capital are similar across countries and (2) returns to capital are slightly higher in middle-income countries to justify the ‡ows of capital from rich and poor countries to middle-income countries. Managerial ability is not, of course, the single explanation for di¤erences in TFP and for the pattern of capital ‡ows. I interpret the probability of having a successful risky project in the model as managerial ability. It can also be interpreted as entrepreneurship, institutions or cognitive abilities that increase the likelihood of having a successful project.
Why are managerial abilities di¤erent across countries? If managerial ability is important, we should ask why individuals in poor countries decide not to improve their managerial ability.
2 What institutions encourage the acquisition of managerial skills 3 ? The focus of the paper is …rst to understand how managerial ability increases TFP. The reason in the model is: more high ability managers imply a more heavily use of risky projects. It is the change in the composition of safe and risky projects that implies the reversal in the ranking of capital returns-with higher capital returns in middle-income countries.
In the following three sections, I discuss the model, implications, and conclusions.
I discuss the evidence on managerial ability across countries in section 3. All proofs are in the appendix.
2 Prescott (1998) , Hall and Jones (1999) and Caselli (2005) also call attention to the question of why there are di¤erences in total factor productivity. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007) provide evidence that low capital ‡ows can be explained by low productivity in poor countries. Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2004) , on the other hand, consider credit market risk.
3 Murphy et al. (1991) discuss how institutions a¤ect the allocation of talent to entrepreneurship. Rosenzweig (1996, 2004) and Bils and Klenow (2000) discuss how expected growth encourages schooling. In a similar way, expected growth and institutions could also encourage the acquisition of managerial skills.
THE MODEL: RISKY PROJECTS AND MANAGERIAL ABILITY
The main components of the model are intermediaries and managers who decide to undertake safe or risky projects. The model is a version of the framework in Imrohoroglu and Kumar (2004) .
There is a continuum of one-period lived, risk neutral managers, with measure one. Their only endowment is human capital. They borrow physical capital from intermediaries to fund their projects. There are two kinds of projects: a safe project and a risky project. The technology of the safe project is y (k) = Ak h 1 where k is physical capital per worker, h is human capital per worker, is the physical capital share and A is a productivity parameter. The technology of the risky project is
Each manager is indexed by the potential to succeed in the risky project, denoted by a 2 [0; 1]. I interpret the potential to succeed in the risky project as managerial ability or entrepreneurship. A manager with ability a has probability (a) of being successful in the risky project. The probability (a) increases with a. The outcome of the safe project does not depend on managerial ability. Managerial ability is private information. The distribution of abilities is given by F , with density function f . Let x be a proxy for managerial ability. This assumption allows us to associate each country with a distribution of managerial ability. x can be human capital, income, entrepreneurship, or institutions that encourage agents to undertake risky projects or to acquire management skills. In order to obtain analytical results, suppose that the distribution F shifts to the right when x increases. That is, the cumulative distribution of managerial ability F ( jx 0 ) …rst order stochastic dominates F ( jx) when
It is easier to …nd a high-ability manager when x is high.
Intermediaries pool project risk and guarantee a rate of return to capital r. Intermediation occurs within each period. Intermediaries cannot make contracts contingent on managerial ability as ability is private information. For this reason, they o¤er the quantity of capital k r and the interest rate r r for the managers who undertake the risky project, and the interest rate r s for the managers who undertake the safe project. Managers choose the quantity of capital in the safe project given the interest rate r s . On the other hand, they have to use k r units of capital, to be determined in equilibrium, if they undertake the risky project and pay the interest rate r r . The intermediary appropriates the production if the project fails.
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At the beginning of the period, the managers invest in the safe or risky project. At the end of the period, the managers of safe projects and successful risky projects consume their output net of interest payments, the managers of failed projects consume zero, and the intermediaries pay the interest r to consumers.
The sum of capital invested in the safe and risky projects is equal to the total quantity of capital k. The division of k into capital in risky and safe projects occurs within the period. We may view the total quantity of capital k, available in the beginning of the period, as the result of an intertemporal maximization problem in which consumers decide between consumption and savings. This intertemporal problem is not important to us. The key equilibrium value is the interest rate given the levels of x, h and k. The objective is to see how taking into account the ability to run risky projects implies similar equilibrium interest rates across countries given
x, h and k for each country. 5 This …nancial contract is also considered in Imrohoroglu and Kumar (2004) . We could also consider veri…cation costs, but this is not essential for the results. 6 The intertemporal problem is max P 1 t=0 t u (c t ) s.t. c t + k t+1 = (1 ) k t + r t k t , where k t is the total quantity of capital in the beginning of each period.
Solving the model
A manager with ability a decides whether to undertake a safe or a risky project.
The manager solves the problem max max
The left hand side has the pro…ts if the safe project is undertaken. The right hand side has the expected pro…ts if the risky project is undertaken. The optimal quantity of capital in the safe project is independent of the level of ability. 7 The intermediary o¤ers the interest rate r s for the safe project and the contract (r r ; k r ) for the risky project. As discussed above, it is not possible to o¤er k r according to the ability of the manager because a is private information. The intermediary o¤ers the same contract for all managers willing to undertake the risky project. The level of capital in risky projects is not exogenous. We determine k r in equilibrium. Private information is not important for the results. I am focusing in the problem with private information because it is more realistic and easier to discuss. Having full information, and so k r as a function of a, does not change the conclusions of the paper.
There is a threshold ability level z such that the manager undertakes the safe project if a < z, and undertakes the risky project if a z. z is such that
Given z, the measure of successful risky projects, (z; x), and the measure of unsuc- 7 The payment of human capital is not in the problem because each manager is endowed with human capital. Another way of understanding why the payment of human capital is not in the problem is to consider that managers take the level of human capital in the economy as given. A higher h increases production in safe and risky projects, but managers cannot a¤ect the level of h. cessful risky projects, (z; x), are de…ned by
Assume that intermediaries and managers act competitively and that there is free entry of intermediaries. With these assumptions, the equilibrium values of z, k s and k r coincide with the values that maximize total expected output. Therefore, we obtain z, k s and k r by maximizing total expected output, max z, ks, kr
subject to the resource constraint
Once we …nd the optimal values of z, k s and k r , we obtain the interest rates r s and r r by the marginal condition r s = y 0 (k s ) and by (2).
The …rst order conditions of this problem imply
where (z; x) is the ratio between the number of successful projects to the total of risky projects, (z; x) (z; x) = [1 F (z; x)], and is the Lagrange multiplier on the resource constraint (5). The second equation solves with equality if 0 < z < 1.
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(z; x) is increasing in z, as is increasing in a. We will see below that is also increasing in the proxy for managerial ability x.
Condition (6) equates the marginal product of risky and safe projects, the …rst weighted by the fraction of successful and unsuccessful risky projects. Substituting the functional forms of the production functions, it yields the ratio of capital used in risky projects to safe projects,
This ratio is important for our purposes because the rate of return to capital increases if more managers engage in risky projects. This ratio is not constant in x because
x changes the distribution of managers and, therefore, changes z. If the fraction of successful risky projects increases with x, then the ratio of capital in risky projects to safe projects increases with x. The following proposition guarantees this.
Proposition 1. The fraction of successful risky projects (z; x) increases with the proxy for managerial ability x. As a corollary, k r =k s is increasing in x.
The proof of x > 0 is involved because both the number of successful risky projects and the number of risky projects increases when x increases-the numerator and denominator that de…ne . We need the probability increasing in a and F (a; x 0 ) to …rst order stochastic dominate F (a; x) when x 0 > x. A more technical condition is that the density f is positive in the set of abilities, to avoid the possibility of being constant in x.
We obtain the threshold level of ability z with (7), (8), and = y 0 (k s ),
where k r =k s is given by (8), with equality if 0 < z < 1.
Recall that the ratio k r =k s does not depend on k or h and so the expression that de…nes z does not depend directly on physical capital or human capital. Therefore, z does not depend on k or h. z depends on the technology parameters and on the proxy for managerial ability x. As k r =k s , z is constant for a proportional increase in
The left-hand side of (9) is the ratio of expected pro…ts from the risky project with ability z to the pro…ts from the safe project. z = 1 means that all agents undertake the safe project. As A H > A, this cannot happen if the probability (1) is close enough to one. Analogously, z = 0 means that all agents undertake the risky project.
This can only happen if A L or (0) are too high, that is, there are su¢ cient gains even if the project fails. This intuition is con…rmed in the proposition below. We can, therefore, easily have conditions to imply existence of z, 0 < z < 1.
Proposition 2. Existence of z, 0 < z < 1. Suppose that (1) is su¢ ciently close to one and that A L =A H and (0) are su¢ ciently close to zero. Then, there exists a threshold level of ability z, 0 < z < 1 such that equation (9) is satis…ed with equality.
The ability of the managers in the threshold risky project, z, increases with the proxy for managerial ability, z x > 0. Countries with more high-ability managers use a manager with higher ability in the marginal project than countries with less high-ability managers. 9 Rauch (1991) obtains a similar result in a di¤erent model.
One of the objectives in Rauch (1991) is to show that countries with more skilled 9 In Imrohoroglu and Kumar (2004) , in contrast, intermediation costs restrict the use of capital in risky projects and imply higher managerial ability in the marginal project in countries with less capital. I analyze further the di¤erent predictions in the next section.
workers (richer countries) export managers and import skilled employees. The same conclusions would apply to the present paper.
To show that z increases in x, de…ne as the left-hand side of (9). With 0 < z < 1, z is given by (z; x) = 1. Therefore, z x = x = z . We have x < 0 in general and z > 0 for certain conditions given below, usually valid. Intuitively, decreases with x because the ratio of successful risky projects to the total of risky projects increases when x increases, and so capital in risky projects increases. Therefore, returns decrease in the marginal risky project relative to returns in the marginal safe project. As a result, decreases. z > 0 means that returns increase in the marginal risky project relative to the returns in the marginal safe project when managerial ability increases. With x < 0 and z > 0, z x > 0.
Proposition 3. z is increasing in x. Suppose that z < 1= or, alternatively, that the distribution of abilities is not concentrated in any level of ability (f (a; x) is small). Then, the threshold ability level z increases with the proxy for managerial ability, x.
De…ne (x) as the ratio of the total quantity of capital to the capital used in safe projects, (x) = k=k s . By the resource constraint (5),
is known once we have the equilibrium value of z in (9). We obtain the value of k s by k s = k= (x) and the value of k r by (8). We obtain r s and r r by r s = Ak 1 h 1 and r r by (2). This completes the determination of the endogenous variables in the model. We will see that (x) summarizes how managerial ability a¤ects total factor productivity and how managerial abilities increases returns to capital.
IMPLICATIONS: RETURNS TO CAPITAL
Returns to capital depend on the quantity of physical and human capital and on the distribution of managerial abilities. A favorable distribution of managerial abilities increases returns to capital. Economies with little capital may have low returns to capital if it is di¢ cult to …nd high-ability managers to run projects.
Revenues of intermediaries from safe and risky projects are given by
The …rst term in the right hand side are revenues from safe projects. The remaining terms account for revenues from risky projects. The intermediary collects the output of unsuccessful projects. We have r r given by equation (2) and r s = Ak
Substituting the values of the interest rates and using the expression of in (10), we
Returns to capital are de…ned as r = rev=k. Setting this value of r implies zero pro…ts for the intermediaries. To analyze the rate of return to capital, focus on the …rst term in the expression of returns and substitute k s = k= . 10 We have
(x) summarizes the e¤ect of the distribution of managerial abilities. As the proxy for managerial ability increases, the value of increases.
is total factor productivity. To see this, consider the expression for total
. This expression yields
Therefore, we can express di¤erences in managerial ability as di¤erences in TFP in one closed form. TFP can be written as a function of managerial ability. The contribution of the model is to provide a way to understand how managerial ability increases TFP. TFP is higher because the number of risky projects increases with the number of high ability managers.
Proposition 4. TFP increases with x. Suppose that z x is small or, alternatively, that the distribution of abilities is not concentrated in any level of ability (f (a; x) is small). Then, (x) is increasing with x and hence TFP increases with x.
k and h do not a¤ect . If physical or human capital, however, have positive correlation with factors that change the potential of managers to be successful in risky projects, then the di¤erence in returns to capital across countries changes. Richer countries can have higher returns to capital. This is more likely to happen in middleincome countries, which have a higher level of capital than poor countries but have a much di¤erent distribution of managers. If managerial ability is imperfectly captured by aggregate measures of physical and human capital, such as k and h, then the variation of k and h alone cannot explain the variation in TFP.
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As (x) = k=k s (x), when increases then the quantity of capital invested in the safe project k s decreases. The rate of return to capital depends on the number of risky projects. By the formula of returns, r Ak Bils and Klenow (2000) , Caselli (2005) and others …nd that physical and human capital alone cannot explain the variation in TFP. There is also a discussion whether the direction of causality is from human capital development (schooling) to growth or from growth to human capital. Bils and Klenow (2000) , Kumar (2003) and Rosenzweig (1996, 2004) increases, then returns to capital decrease. More high ability managers imply more risky projects. Two economies with the same level of human capital and physical capital can have di¤erent returns if they have di¤erent distributions of managerial abilities. We know that the endowments of human capital and physical capital are related to TFP. What we have here is an explanation for why human capital (in the form of managerial ability) is positively correlated with TFP.
Numerical Analysis
Capital ‡ows with little intensity. Capital ‡ows from rich and poor countries to middle-income countries. I explain this pattern by showing that returns to capital can be close across countries and higher in middle-income countries. This happens in the model because managerial ability increases TFP by the increase in risky projects.
To calculate the quantitative predictions of the model, I use data on physical capital and human capital in Rodriguez-Clare (1997, 2005) , on educational attainment in Barro and Lee (2001) , and on entrepreneurship from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) (Reynolds et al. 2005) . I …rst relate the distribution of managerial abilities with physical capital, human capital and higher education. I later relate the distribution of managerial abilities with indicators of entrepreneurship. More human capital and physical capital increase the number of managers able to be successful in a risky project. Human capital and physical capital-past investments in education or equipment-make management more e¤ective, for example, by improving management techniques and communication equipment. Moreover, Bates (1990) …nds a positive relation between years of higher education and entrepreneurship. 12 In the end of this section, I discuss further the relation between managerial ability and education. 12 Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare construct the measures of human capital from Barro and Lee. I use directly the data of educational attainment in the speci…cations with higher education. See Lazear (2005) for a theory of entrepreneurship. A di¤erent approach is to use the distribution of …rm size to infer the distribution of managerial talent (Lucas 1978) . Data on …rm size across countries, however, is usually not comparable or not available, especially for low-income countries.
Suppose that the distribution of managerial abilities is F (a; x) = a x , where x is positively related to physical or human capital. Denote the level of physical and human capital in country i by k i and h i , and the average number of years in higher education by hyr i . Consider six cases, depending on how x is related to the data:
, where i = 1 denotes the smallest values of hyr, h, or k. The …rst three cases directly relate the proxy with higher education, human capital, and physical capital. The other cases take into account the shares of human capital and physical capital (I later relate x with indicators of entrepreneurship across countries, and discuss how x can be related to institutions).
The distribution of abilities in the country with lowest physical or human capital is uniform-F (a; x) = a when i = 1-and the distribution of abilities with higher proxies …rst order stochastically dominates the distribution of abilities with lower proxies. This speci…cation highlights the main mechanism of the model to a¤ect returns to capital. It is easier to …nd a high-ability manager as human capital or physical capital increase.
For simplicity, the probability of success in the risky project is linear, (a) = a.
Given the functional forms of F (a; x) and (a), we have (z;
The assumption (a) = a is intended to keep the simplest as possible. It is possible to replicate changes in with changes in F . For example, an economy with higher probability of success for each ability level (higher (a)) may behave as an economy with smaller probabilities of success but more high-ability managers.
The model transfers the explanation of capital ‡ows from intermediation costs to managerial ability. To make this clear, I …rst apply the same data of Imrohoroglu and Kumar (2004) same, the correlation of the logs of capital and income per worker is 0:96.
The variety of countries is an advantage of the dataset of Klenow and RodriguezClare. We later use the dataset of Caselli and Feyrer (2007) and, as mentioned above, the GEM dataset (both described later). These two datasets have less countries, and the countries are concentrated in the highest quartiles of Klenow and RodriguezClare. There are no countries of the lowest quartile in Caselli and Feyrer and there is only one country of the lowest quartile (Uganda) in the GEM dataset.
I assume that the capital share is equal to 0:35 and the depreciation rate is equal to 9 percent in all countries. For the productivity parameters A H , A and A L , I set A L = 0 and calculate A H and A such that the net return is equal to 7 percent and the capital-output ratio is equal to 3 in the richest quartile.
14 See appendix for the (2005) is similar. It is in Fig 2. ) According to the model, returns to capital in all countries are between 6 and 10 percent, with higher returns in middleincome countries (third quartile). This pattern appears in all six speci…cations with managerial ability. The model predicts much closer returns across countries than the neoclassical model. Returns closer across countries imply that capital ‡ows with low intensity. Higher returns in middle-income countries imply that capital ‡ows to 14 Imrohoroglu and Kumar (2004) also follow this calibration. The di¤erence is that they do not vary the distribution of abilities as income increases. They explain the pattern of capital ‡ows by the introduction of intermediation costs e in each country. In comparison to their model, I set e = 0 and explain changes in returns on capital with changes in managerial abilities. Their model collapses to the neoclassical model when e = 0. The present model collapses to the neoclassical model when x does not vary across countries. middle-income countries. More precisely, the model predicts that capital ‡ows with low intensity to countries in the third quartile of capital per worker.
The neoclassical returns in …gure 1, calculated with x = 1 for all quartiles, take into account human capital in the production function, as in Lucas (1990) . Without human capital, returns go much beyond the limits of the …gure. Even with human capital, the neoclassical model predicts that net returns in the lowest quartile are more than twice the net returns in the richest quartile.
All deviations from the neoclassical model are the result of changes in the distribution of managerial abilities. According to the speci…cation of x, the median of the distribution of abilities increases from 0:5, in the lowest quartile, to around 0:9 in the highest quartile.
15 Is this variation excessive? According to the data, the level of human capital in the highest quartile is 20 times the level in the lowest quartile, and the corresponding level of physical capital is 40 times the level in the lowest quartile.
Educational quality increases even more the di¤erence in human capital (Hanushek and Woessmann 2007) . It would not be a surprise to see substantial di¤erences in the distribution of managerial abilities across countries. It is possible that the true distributions of abilities are such that poor countries have even fewer high-ability managers as compared to rich countries than I assume in these exercises.
16 Table 1 shows gross returns (not discounting depreciation) relative to returns in the highest quartile of capital per worker. In the neoclassical model, returns in the …rst quartile are 11 times higher than returns in the highest quartile. The di¤er-ence decreases to 1:55 times when we add human capital to the production function.
Returns are much closer when we add the e¤ect of the distribution of managerial abilities. Returns in middle-income countries exceed those in poor and rich countries.
Returns are lowest in poor countries under the speci…cations with x = hyr i =hyr 1 ,
1 and x = (k i =k 1 ) . This occurs because the proxy varies less in the last two speci…cations.
The highest returns are for countries in the third quartile.
The reason for the increase in returns to capital from the …rst to the third quartile is the increase in the relative number of risky projects. Risky projects, if successful, are more productive than safe projects. Countries with more high-ability managers bene…t more from the risky technology. There are more risky projects in economies with more high-ability managers, although both technologies are available in all countries. 16 The ‡ow of managers from rich to poor countries could increase returns in poor countries. The implicit assumption is that there are factors such as local knowledge (as culture or language), externalities in ability, or …xed costs (as di¢ culty in matching jobs for family members) that make di¢ cult the migration of managers across countries. As risky and safe technologies are available in all countries, the risky technology should require approximately the same minimum level of managerial ability in all countries. That level of ability, z, equates expected pro…ts in risky and safe projects.
A biotechnology company in the United States and in India would require approximately the same minimum level of managerial ability. We showed, however, that z increases with x. To reconcile the intuition that risky projects should require approximately the same minimum managerial ability, the e¤ect of x on z must be small.
The simulations con…rm the intuition. z does not increase much, about 2 percent, from 0:673 to 0:686, with x = hyr i =hyr 1 (the values are similar for the other proxies) from the poorest to the richest quartile. The manager with lowest ability in the risky project has similar ability in rich and poor countries. This prediction does not mean that the average ability in risky projects is the same in both countries. Rich countries have more high ability managers above the minimum level. The prediction means that innovative companies in poor and rich countries require approximately the same minimum level of managerial ability, slightly more in rich countries. There are less innovative projects in poor countries. When they exist, however, their managers can communicate with the managers in rich countries, as they have similar abilities.
The opposite prediction about z happens in Imrohoroglu and Kumar (2004) . When risky projects pay intermediation costs, z increases to equate expected pro…ts in risky and safe projects. The e¤ect of intermediation costs is weaker with more capital, and so z decreases when capital increases: rich countries have managers with lower ability in risky projects than poor countries. In the present paper, with frictionless credit, z does not change if k or h increases. z increases if the distribution of managers is more favorable (when x increases). As x is positively correlated with k, the model here implies that z increases when capital increases. We should expect countries with more high-ability managers to increase z. These countries use more capital in risky projects and should increase z to equate pro…ts in risky and safe projects.
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The simulations imply that z increases little: for those in risky projects, managerial ability in rich and poor countries is approximately the same.
18 Risky, innovative companies should compete internationally. Even though the general distribution of abilities is di¤erent, it is plausible to expect managers to have approximately the same ability once the project is undertaken if the technology is the same across countries.
In addition to gross returns, table 1 shows the share of output produced from risky projects relative to total output. Countries with more high-ability managers use their capital to fund more risky projects. This has a positive e¤ect on returns. The model predicts that poor countries tend to adopt safe technologies, usually available in traditional sectors, while rich countries tend to adopt new, risky technologies. In support of this prediction, Vandenbussche et al. (2006) …nd that countries with more skilled workers are closer to the technological frontier. These countries adopt newer 17 Rauch (1991) , in a di¤erent model, gives additional intuition for having z higher in richer countries.
18 z increases little because the e¤ect of x is indirect. x increases the fraction of successful risky projects, , which then increases capital in risky projects and increases z. The positive e¤ect of x on z can be made stronger if the probability of sucess in risky projects increases fast when ability increases ( 0 (a) large).
and riskier technologies.
The returns in …gure 1 and table 1 agree with the empirical estimations of Caselli and Feyrer (2007) . In an independent study, Caselli and Feyrer …nd returns to capital of 6:9 percent in poor countries and 8:4 percent in rich countries. I …nd returns between 6 and 10 percent, shown in …gure 1. With the standard deviations calculated by Caselli and Feyrer (1:9 percent for rich countries and 3:7 percent for poor countries), the estimations of returns to capital are between 3:2 and 10:6 percent for poor countries and 6:5 and 10:3 percent for rich countries, consistent with …gure Fig. 2 . Net returns to capital. Same procedure as in …gure 1, with data from Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (2005) . Human capital calculated with the procedure to obtain BK4, as in Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) , the same measure used in …gure 1 and in Imrohoroglu and Kumar (2004) . Physical capital for each quartile: k i = 0:020, 0:102, 0:401, 1. Human capital for each quartile: h i = 0:0354, 0:143, 0:523, 1. Physical and human capital normalized by the highest quartile. predicts returns to capital between 6 and 10 percent, the predictions of the model agree with the data.
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I …nd returns to capital consistent with the estimates of Caselli and Feyrer but they explain the small di¤erence in returns across countries in a di¤erent way. In Caselli and Feyrer, the di¤erence in returns is small because poor countries have more land in the production function and agriculture is more important in GDP. Here, the di¤erence in returns is small because high-ability managers in poor countries are more di¢ cult to …nd. The two explanations are related. If in poor countries there are not institutions that allow agents to keep the output of their work, or if there are institutions that block entrepreneurial behavior, then agents will not invest in managerial ability. It will be harder to …nd high-ability managers and traditional sectors, such as agriculture, will be more important in these countries.
What is the direct evidence on managerial ability across countries? I have used so far physical capital, human capital and years of higher education to de…ne proxies for managerial ability. The advantage is that data for k, h, and hyr exist for many countries and, as these variables have been used extensively in other applications, we know more precisely their properties. But it is useful to use direct measures of managerial ability, even if we have data for less countries.
I now use a direct measure of managerial ability. The data is from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM). The GEM produces a database on entrepreneurship comparable across countries. Its …rst survey was in 1999, with 10 countries, and its most recent survey, in 2007, had 42 countries. The GEM asks the same questions to a sample of two thousand individuals in each country. It de…nes an entrepreneur as someone creating a …rm or an owner and manager of a new …rm (…rms up to 3.5 years old). Reynolds et al. (2005) describe the implementation of GEM and discuss the survey questions and the reliability of the dataset. Ardagna and Lusardi (2008) discuss further the reliability of the GEM dataset.
I focus on the indices of total entrepreneurship activity out of necessity (teanec), and total entrepreneurship activity to pursue an opportunity (teaopp). The total entrepreneurship activity is the ratio of entrepreneurs to the number of individuals in the sample. The question "You are, alone or with others, currently trying to start a new business, including any self-employment or selling any goods or services to others?," as it is in Reynolds et al. (2005) (and other questions to assure that the initiative is recent and that the person took actions to start the business), identify an entrepreneur. All indices restrict to individuals aged 18 to 64. An advantage of having interviews instead of governmental records is the inclusion of …rms in the formal and informal sectors and of people creating a business without having it registered yet. "Are you involved in this start-up/…rm to take advantage of a business opportunity or because you have no better choices of work?,"identify the activity as for necessity or opportunity.
I relate managerial ability in the model to entrepreneurship for opportunity. Risky projects in the model are potentially more productive-they have A H > A-but represent new technologies with a risk of producing zero. Countries with more entrepreneurs for opportunity than for necessity have more managers that choose the risky project and so have more high ability managers.
The entrepreneurship indices for necessity and opportunity behave in di¤erent ways in poor and rich countries. Total entrepreneurship activity and the indices teanec and teaopp are larger in poor countries (probably because poor countries have a larger informal sector and more small …rms), but entrepreneurship for opportunity is more frequent than entrepreneurship for necessity in rich countries: the ratio teaopp=teanec is higher in rich countries. Ardagna and Lusardi (2008) regress the entrepreneurship indices on education and other individual characteristics. They …nd that entrepreneurs for opportunity have more education and more con…dence in their skills than entrepreneurs for necessity.
Let the proxy for managerial ability in a country be now de…ned as the ratio The peak of returns is now in the second quartile, but the di¤erence in returns across quartiles is small. Moreover, the number of countries in the third and second quartiles decreased from 22 to 11 countries in the third and 2 countries in the second quartile, which decreases the precision of the point estimates and increases the probability of having similar returns to capital, about seven percent for all countries. The returns 21 With the 35 countries, the teaopp=teanec for a country is the average of the four surveys for each year, I then take the average of the countries in each quartile to obtain g i . With the 108 observations in country and years of surveys, I take the average of the observations for each quartile. With the 35 countries, g i = 1:15, 3:40, 2:59, 7:78 from the poorest to the richest quartile. With the 108 observations, g i = 1:15, 2:71, 2:56, 7:96. A and A H are similar for the two speci…cations, the values in the appendix are for the 108 observations. agree with the previous …ndings, but the results are sharper by avoiding the e¤ect of outliers, as we see next.
To avoid the e¤ect of outliers, I calculated g i with income per capita for each quartile and the coe¢ cients of the regression of teaopp=teanec of each country on income per capita.
22 I found returns to capital equal to 6:1, 7:0, 9:2, and 7:0 percent.
The peak of returns, in this case, is back to the third quartile. The pattern of returns is very similar to the pattern with the other proxies in …gure 1. Using the GEM dataset does not change the conclusions obtained with the other proxies.
Additional evidence on managerial ability across countries comes from the increasing literature about the e¤ect of managerial ability on …rm value. Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) …nd a large spread in management practices across medium …rms in U.S., U.K., France and Germany. One of the most important factors to explain the dispersion of managerial ability is the transmission of control. They …nd that familyowned …rms in which the Chief Executive O¢ cer is the eldest male child tend to have lower indicators of managerial ability. Caselli and Gennaioli (2005) state that it is more common to have the transmission of ownership and control from one generation to the other in poor countries. 23 Combined with the evidence that …rms managed by the descendants of the owner have lower managerial ability, they argue that we should expect lower managerial ability in poorer countries. Gabaix and Landier (2008) , on the other hand, calibrate their model with a very low dispersion of managerial ability.
They focus on managerial abilities of the top CEOs (the CEOs of the largest …rms)
to study executive compensation. The managers in the present model, however, are all managers in a country, not only the top CEOs, and we should expect a higher dispersion of managerial ability for the whole population of managers. The evidence in these papers agrees with the indicators in the GEM dataset. I use the GEM dataset in the simulations because it has more comparable data across countries and more countries.
Before using the GEM dataset, I de…ned proxies for x based on human capital, physical capital and years of higher education. Is education a good proxy for managerial ability? I discuss this question in more detail now. I add evidence from Ardagna and Lusardi (2008) This …nding agrees with the sharp predictions in …gure 1 when using higher education as proxy.
I end this section by discussing the link between managerial ability and institutions.
What moves the distribution of managerial ability? Institutions or other factors such as human capital or physical capital? Put simply, forcing people to study will not increase the number of high-ability managers. 24 Managerial ability is de…ned as the probability of being successful in risky projects. Learning to increase the probability of being successful in risk projects requires taking conscious actions toward this purpose.
Institutions a¤ect actions. Murphy et al. (1991) present a model in which agents use their talents in productive activities, such as innovation, or in activities that do not produce but only redistribute wealth, such as rent seeking. If agents believe that they cannot keep the pro…ts from their activities-if institutions cannot guarantee these rights-then they will use their talents in rent seeking rather than in innovation. Pritchett (2001 Pritchett ( , 2006 Therefore, what moves the distribution of ability is, ultimately, institutions. In the simulations, I use human capital, physical capital, higher education, and entrepreneurship for x instead of using institutions. The variables that I used, however, are positively related to institutions. Good institutions in place for a long time imply high levels of human capital, physical capital, higher education, and entrepreneurship. Desai et al. (2003) and Ardagna and Lusardi (2008) …nd evidence that institutions a¤ect entrepreneurship. Desai et al., in a sample of European countries, …nd that less corruption and more protection of property rights increase rates of entry, decrease rates of exit, and lower average …rm size. Ardagna and Lusardi, with the GEM dataset, …nd that more e¢ cient judicial systems and less stringent entry and labor market regulations increase entrepreneurship for opportunity. If agents believe that they can start a new business to pursue an opportunity, they will investment in managerial ability. The model presented here takes managerial ability as given to
show that more managerial ability implies higher returns to capital. But the decision to invest in managerial ability is a result of institutions. An extension of the model is to include the decision to invest in managerial ability. Agents will invest in managerial ability if they have incentives to do so.
CONCLUSION
This paper shows how managerial ability can increase total factor productivity and explain capital ‡ows. Managerial ability increases the number of risky projects.
All countries have access to the same technology and the technology has decreasing returns to capital. Nevertheless, returns in poor countries are smaller than returns in rich countries. The availability of high-ability managers compensates the decreasing productivity of capital.
I construct proxies for managerial ability with physical capital, human capital, years of higher education, and indicators of entrepreneurship. Returns are close across countries, the model predicts, and middle-income countries have higher returns to capital than poor and rich countries.
The model also explains why capital ‡ows have maintained their pattern although …nancial innovation decreased intermediation costs. As it is more di¢ cult to increase managerial ability, richer countries can have higher returns to capital if their distribution of managerial abilities is more favorable.
One way to understand the results is that there are no frictions for capital movements but there are relevant frictions for the movement of managerial ability. One extension of the model is to allow capital ‡ows to combine ‡ows of capital and managerial ability. In this way, we can look for predictions on the ‡ows of managerial ability across countries. Another important direction for research is to understand why agents would not invest in their managerial abilities in poor countries. Institutions are probably important for investment in managerial abilities. There will be entrepreneurs only if there are institutions that enable them to exist. Therefore, = 1 (z) = > 1 as > and = > 0 by the equilibrium condition. By continuity, this condition is also true if A L is su¢ ciently close to zero. Proposition 2. Existence of z, 0 < z < 1. Proof. De…ne (z; x) as the left-hand side of (9).
is the ratio of the expected pro…ts from the risky project with ability z to the pro…t from the safe project. The strategy of the proof is to show that we have (1; x) > 1, if (1) is su¢ ciently high, and (0; x) < 0, if A L =A H and (0) are su¢ ciently small. As (z; x) is continuous, there exists a z, 0 < z < 1. These conditions are met, for example, with (a) = a and A L = 0.
For (1; x) > 1. We have lim z!1 (z; x) = 0 (z) =F 0 (z) = (1) > 0. Then 
(1 (0; x) ) . This condition is satis…ed if A L =A H and (0) are su¢ ciently close to zero. Proposition 3. z is increasing in x. Proof. Consider that 0 < z < 1. Therefore, z is given by (z; x) = 1, where is the left-hand side of (9), and z x = x = z . x < 0 in general and z > 0 for certain conditions given below. Hence z x > 0. a. Therefore, x (z; h) < 0. b. z > 0 Recall that the …rst order conditions imply (z; x) = 1. We have (0; x) < 0 and (1; x) > 1. If z is unique, then in increasing in its …rst argument in the neighborhood of z and so z > 0. In all functional forms considered in this paper, z is unique. But there can be particular forms of f (a; x) such that z is not unique. In this case, the maximum of the objective function must be for the smallest z such that (z; x) = 1 because, with this, there are more managers that undertake the risky project (I present a formal argument below). As (0; x) < 0, the smallest z for which (z; x) = 1 is such that is increasing in z in its neighborhood and so z > 0. The formal argument that follows presents a condition to imply z > 0. We 
Therefore, z > 0 if and only if z < 1 1 ( > 1, see above). We have 1 1 > 1 and usually z < 1 (in particular, lim z!1 z = 1=2). But it can be the case that z > 1
for certain values of z and x. Use the de…nition of to write z = f (z)
Then, use the optimality condition = 1 to obtain = 1 (z) A=A H , for A L = 0 (the argument is the same for A L 6 = 0). Hence, > 0. If we have multiple z's, the smallest one will be such that 1 F (z) is large. So, this condition is probably always met although [1 F (z)] =f (z) may be smaller than 1. Another way of having the inequality above is assuming that the distribution of abilities is not concentrated in any level of ability and so f (z) is small. A su¢ cient condition is simply z < 1= . Proposition 4. TFP is increasing in x. Proof. TFP is equal to A (x)
1
. So, we have to prove that (x) is increasing in x. As (x) = k=k s (x), this property says that the quantity of capital invested in the safe project decreases with x, as stated in the text. As (z; x) = F (z; x) + [1 F (z; x)] , we have two e¤ects of the increase in x. The …rst e¤ect is the direct increase in , as x > 0, and the decrease in F , as F x < 0. The decrease in F has a net positive e¤ect because F x F x = F x ( 1) > 0, as > 1. Therefore, the …rst e¤ect is positive. The second e¤ect is caused by the increase in z implied by z x > 0. Formally, x > 0 if and only if [1 F (z; x)] ( z z x + x ) ( 1) F x > f (z; x) z x . If z x > 0 is small, or if f (z; x) is small (f is not concentrated in any particular ability) then this condition is veri…ed as the left-hand side is always positive. We have lim x!1 (x) = lim x!1 = (A H =A) 
